• control
• Moral responsibility
• voluntariness
• voluntary control

This thesis aims to understand whether voluntary control is a necessary condition of moral responsibility. In the first chapter, I elucidate what is usually meant by "moral responsibility", "control", and "voluntary control", and I introduce voluntarism as a theory that takes voluntary control to be a condition of moral responsibility. In the second chapter, I argue against such a voluntarist account of moral responsibility. The third chapter is dedicated to theories of moral responsibility that reject a voluntary control condition. I specifically take into consideration T. M. Scanlon, Angela Smith, and Pamela Hieronymi's accounts. Lastly, in the fourth chapter, I discuss two objections that have been raised against this sort of theories (by Neil Levy and David Shoemaker) and argue why I take only a modified version of the "bad and blameworthy" objection by Levy to be an effective challenge to these accounts.