• Blackwater
• Iraq
• mercenaries
• private military companies

This thesis aims at examining one of the most controversial and recurring actors in the history of warfare: the mercenary. Despite having origins as ancient as war itself, the soldier of fortune has managed to adapt to ever-changing war scenarios, persisting to the present day. This analysis begins at the onset of the Cold War, examining the mercenary in their classic sense: the soldier without a flag, employed by whoever can afford their services. The study then transitions to the end of the bipolar conflict, which marked the demise of this clandestine figure in favor of more organized and, above all, legal private military companies. The operations of these post-Cold War actors will be highlighted, emphasizing their fundamental characteristics, the dynamics of their engagement in various theatres of war, and their impact on the conflicts in which they were employed. The analysis concludes in 2009, with the end of Blackwater USA's engagement in Iraq, one of the most infamous PMCs for human rights violations against the local population. The company founded by Erik Prince was chosen for its significant media coverage, crucial for raising public awareness in the United States and internationally about the existence and consequences of employing contractors. Moreover, Blackwater, being a US company, represents a particularly significant case study for understanding the phenomenon of the use of contractors at the international level. Equally, the United States, as the primary user of such services, provides an ideal context for examining the characteristics, implications, and controversies associated with the operations of private military companies. The discussion of historical events related to mercenaries and contractors will alternate with a legal examination of the status of these actors at both the international and domestic levels. The analysis will delve into the instruments that regulate their activities, highlighting the deficiencies that hinder effective accountability for these soldiers, with particular attention to the torture conducted in the Iraqi prison of Abu Ghraib by both the US military and supporting contractors.
Finally, this study demonstrates how the emergence of private military and security companies marks the next step in the evolution of mercenarism. The ability to engage in combat through employment contracts, conducted openly and with significant legal protections for illegal acts, has opened up new possibilities for mercenaries and those who manage their activities. Although regulatory frameworks exist for these activities, they have proven to be inadequate in ensuring justice for victims of contractors, thanks in part to the cooperation of the states that request their services.
The benefits derived from PMCs, such as flexibility, efficiency, and savings in state military resources, make these actors important tools for the foreign policies of world powers. At the same time, the inability to control the actions of contractors causes substantial damage to the image of the states that employ them and, through a perhaps voluntary inertia, protect.