• incoherence
• bounded rationality
• logic and reasoning
• ecological context
• reasoning function
• dual cognitive system

The thesis ”Rationality and Incoherence: a bounded perspective”, exploits the topic of incoherence as a key to understand the relationship between reasoning and normative standards. Incoherence characterises the cognitive life of reasoners, however it represents a problem for many of the current normative models developed in decision theory and logic. The goal of the thesis is to show how combining a careful analysis of the sources and the value of incoherence to the research developed by current empirical studies on reasoning supports a new point of view on the normative standards of reasoning. Specifically, one which focuses on the concepts of context of application and cognitive weight. I focus, in particular, on the naturalistic models of fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer) in relation to the dual system of reasoning (D. Kahneman), on the concept of ecological and "constrained" rationality and on the theory of argumentative reasoning (H. Mercier, D. Sperber). I propose an argument in favor of a logical normative standard that does not avoid the issue of incoherence, but allows for an appropriate analysis of it. Using models of epistemic logic and fractional semantics (M. Piazza, G. Pulcini), moreover, I show the features a theory of reasoning should have. I argue for models which are contextually relevant and assign a “weight” to logical propositions, so that they can be compared by the reasoner when dealing with incoherence.