Tesi etd-05152014-155034 |
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Tipo di tesi
Tesi di laurea magistrale
Autore
FABBRI, FEDERICO
URN
etd-05152014-155034
Titolo
The "Merger Paradox" and Bertrand Competition with Equally-Sized Firms
Dipartimento
ECONOMIA E MANAGEMENT
Corso di studi
SCIENZE ECONOMICHE
Relatori
relatore Prof. Salvadori, Neri
Parole chiave
- Bertrand Competition
- Capacity Constraints
- Homogeneous Product
- Merger Paradox
- Symmetric Oligopoly
- Symmetric Triopoly
Data inizio appello
18/06/2014
Consultabilità
Completa
Riassunto
The essay models theoretically horizontal mergers effects in noncooperative static pricing games, among a fixed number of equally capacity-constrained oligopolists. We will show that in symmetric, homogeneous product oligopolies à la Bertrand-Edgeworth horizontal mergers that create a bigger market player, horizontal mergers are always (weakly) profitable for merging firms, raising price over pre-merger level.
File
| Nome file | Dimensione |
|---|---|
| The_Merg...Firms.pdf | 1.05 Mb |
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