Tipo di tesi
Tesi di laurea magistrale
Titolo
The "Merger Paradox" and Bertrand Competition with Equally-Sized Firms
Dipartimento
ECONOMIA E MANAGEMENT
Corso di studi
SCIENZE ECONOMICHE
Parole chiave
- Bertrand Competition
- Capacity Constraints
- Homogeneous Product
- Merger Paradox
- Symmetric Oligopoly
- Symmetric Triopoly
Data inizio appello
18/06/2014
Riassunto (Italiano)
The essay models theoretically horizontal mergers effects in noncooperative static pricing games, among a fixed number of equally capacity-constrained oligopolists. We will show that in symmetric, homogeneous product oligopolies à la Bertrand-Edgeworth horizontal mergers that create a bigger market player, horizontal mergers are always (weakly) profitable for merging firms, raising price over pre-merger level.
