ETD

• arkworks
• groth16
• marlin
• noir
• plonk
• proof of knowledge
• snark
• snarkjs
• zero-knowledge
• zkp
• zksnark
• zokrates

Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zkSNARK) are a rapidly evolving field of study which is enabling breakthroughs in decentralised applications, verifiable computation, self-sovereign identity, as well as machine learning. As such, zkSNARKs are being applied in scenarios where security and privacy are the primary concern. However, with protocol definitions which span multiple fields in mathematics and theoretical computer science, it remains challenging for a developer of such applications to assess the security assumptions, efficiency trade-offs, and suitability of different protocols. Some libraries such as arkworks and snarkjs exist to simplify the workflow of developers in implementing zkSNARK protocols in various applications, but they usually treat the backend protocol as a black-box, focusing on simplicity of use for non-cryptographers rather than clarity of the underlying cryptographic assumptions.

This work addresses this gap by providing a systematic and comparative analysis of modern zero-knowledge proof systems. We present an in-depth analysis of the most prominent zkSNARKs in the current literature, with a theoretical comparison focusing on security analysis, cryptographic assumptions, and computational costs of proof size and prover/verifier time. We then analyse the most notable libraries for implementing zkSNARK protocols, highlighting the mismatch between available protocol implementations and the abstractions exposed to developers. Finally, we analyse a range of real-world applications, to identify how protocol properties influence their suitability across different scenarios. Building on this analysis, we present a developer-friendly guide to support informed selection of zero-knowledge protocols while preserving awareness of their security and performance implications.