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Tesi etd-05152014-155034


Thesis type
Tesi di laurea magistrale
Author
FABBRI, FEDERICO
URN
etd-05152014-155034
Title
The "Merger Paradox" and Bertrand Competition with Equally-Sized Firms
Struttura
ECONOMIA E MANAGEMENT
Corso di studi
SCIENZE ECONOMICHE
Commissione
relatore Prof. Salvadori, Neri
Parole chiave
  • Symmetric Triopoly
  • Homogeneous Product
  • Symmetric Oligopoly
  • Bertrand Competition
  • Capacity Constraints
  • Merger Paradox
Data inizio appello
18/06/2014;
Consultabilità
completa
Riassunto analitico
The essay models theoretically horizontal mergers effects in noncooperative static pricing games, among a fixed number of equally capacity-constrained oligopolists. We will show that in symmetric, homogeneous product oligopolies à la Bertrand-Edgeworth horizontal mergers that create a bigger market player, horizontal mergers are always (weakly) profitable for merging firms, raising price over pre-merger level.
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