• influenza
• law&economics
• lobbying
• regolazione
• trasparenza

Regulation of the private interests’ influence in politics has been justified by economists through the market inefficiencies stemmed from rent-seeking activities. Although the rent-seeking theory offer a positive tool to calculate those inefficiencies, in this paper I argue that lobbying can enhance the legitimacy of a political system if those activities fell under mandatory and full disclosure of information about the actors involved, both politicians and lobbyists. Drawing from the insights of the public policy researches, in this paper I highlight how know the determinants of lobbying can help lobbying regulation to disseminate information about the political process. This goal can be reached just if the regulators are aware of the importance of transparency in the overall legitimacy of the political system.

L’obbiettivo di questo elaborato è analizzare il fenomeno del lobbying e della sua regolazione tramite un approccio economico, con particolare attenzione per quanto riguarda gli effetti della regolazione sul riequilibrio delle asimmetrie informative.