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Tesi etd-06262015-102832


Thesis type
Tesi di laurea magistrale
Author
RICCI, SARA
URN
etd-06262015-102832
Title
Disclosure Risk Assessment via Record Linkage by a Maximum-Knowledge Attacker
Struttura
MATEMATICA
Corso di studi
MATEMATICA
Supervisors
relatore Prof. Domingo-Ferrer, Josep
correlatore Dott. Caboara, Massimo
correlatore Dott. Soria-Comas, Jordi
Parole chiave
  • record linkage
  • permutation paradigm
  • intruder model
  • Data anonymization
  • statistical disclosure control
Data inizio appello
17/07/2015;
Consultabilità
Parziale
Data di rilascio
17/07/2018
Riassunto analitico
Before releasing an anonymized data set, the data protector
must know how safe the data set is, that is, how
much disclosure risk is incurred by the release.
If no privacy model is used to select specific privacy guarantees
prior to anonymization, posterior disclosure risk assessment must
be performed based on the anonymized data set and, if the result
is not satisfactory, anonymization must be repeated with
stricter privacy parameters. Even if a privacy model is used,
it may still be advisable to empirically evaluate disclosure
on the anonymized data set, especially if the privacy model
parameters have been relaxed to improve data utility.
Record linkage is a general methodology to posterior disclosure risk
assessment, whereby the data protector attempts to recreate the attacker's
re-identification scenario.
An important limitation of record linkage is that it usually
requires the data protector to make restrictive assumptions on the attacker's
background knowledge.
To overcome this limitation, we present a
maximum-knowledge attacker model and then we specify and
compare several record linkage tests for such a worst-case attacker.
Our tests are based on comparing the distribution of linkage distances
between the original and the anonymized data set with the distribution of
distances between one of the two previous data sets and one random data set.
The more similar the distributions, the more plausibly deniable are
record linkages claimed by an attacker. Because attaining
zero disclosure risk for all records is too costly in terms of utility,
a less demanding alternative is presented whose goal
is to reduce the maximum per-record disclosure risk.
Note
La tesi in oggetto non è stata inserita correttamente nel data base dall’autore. L’autore stesso ed i relatori sono stati avvertiti di tale omissione.
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