• balance of power
• France
• German-French relations
• Germany
• military
• new power
• nuclear
• nuclear military
• Old power
• West Germany

This PhD thesis aims at describing the relations between France and the Federal Republic of Germany through the lens of the ‘nuclear military factor’, considered in the framework of the European balance of power in the years 1945 to 1966. The ‘nuclear military factor’ can be described as the complex of the industrial, (geo)political, scientific, and technological elements of the nuclear military capability. It was examined if there was a ‘rising’ and a ‘declining power’ in Western Europe during those years, which one was the first one and which one was the second one, and if and how the ‘nuclear military factor’ affected this kind of balance of power. It was decided to choose the years between 1945 and 1966 because those years were crucial in the definition of the Western European order after WW2 – and also of the German-French relations –, and because of the fact that in that frame of time the development (or attempted development) of a nuclear military capability by the two states can be located. It was also decided to write a last paragraph for every chapter to display how the action of the superpowers affected both the French-German tie and Bonn’s and Paris’ self-perception in the Western European arena.
In the first chapter of the thesis, it was described the path leading to the creation of NATO, to the defeat of the European Defense Community, and the birth of the pressing issue of Germany’s rearmament. This issue was central not only in the idea and the rejection of the EDC, but also in France’s outlook to Germany and in Bonn’s perception of its security and of its geopolitical place in the Western European area. The German rearmament, in fact, addressed the need for France to secure its geopolitical position in order to avoid menaces coming from a recent past; it posed the United States problems and questions about how to shape Western bloc and Western defense system; conversely, it threatened Soviet interests; and, in the end, it was the first step for Germany to be taken to regain a (central) position in the geostrategic affairs of Western Europe. Therefore, the need of creating a European community for the defense originated from the French ambition to control and harness German rearmament. The end of Indochina War led to a strong rising of French nationalistic voices, which eventually made the EDC being rejected by the French National Assembly.
The second chapter deals with the rise and fall of nuclear cooperation between Bonn and Paris. While West Germany was (re-)gaining all aspects of its sovereignty, France was beginning to think about how to develop its own nuclear military potential. Given the constant and, at some points, agitated French look to Germany, Paris began to increase its attraction for any present or future German atomic ambition. It was necessary for French ruling class to avoid any national, independent German attempt to manufacture a nuclear bomb, therefore a double road was taken: one on a European level, and the other one on a bi-(and, later, tri-)national level. The first one eventually was successful and led to the creation of Euratom, which had the task of overseeing its members’ civil atomic programs. The second one had a more tormented story. It rose from French proposals and led, at first, to the sign of the Colomb-Béchar Protocol, and, subsequently, to the agreement between Bonn, Paris, and Rome, which lasted very short time and were unable to produce effects. The basic idea was a mutual exchange between France and Germany: the first one would have allowed its nuclear progresses to be shared with Bonn, therefore making it able to develop a nuclear arsenal (under French surveillance); the second one would have offered its industrial and technical resources to the common effort. Western Germany could thus have some of its nuclear bans circumvented, while France could have controlled Bonn’s atomic development in military field and used the Federal Republic’s means to achieve its own ambitions.
The end of the nuclear cooperation and the ‘atomic consequences’ of de Gaulle’s return to power are the center of the fourth chapter. The General immediately ended any kind of nuclear military cooperation between France and other countries, and resolutely pursued the development of an atomic arsenal that could have been used only by France. Closely related to these projects were the ones which had the aim of reforming NATO, reshaping French-German relations, and giving France again the place in the geopolitical arena de Gaulle thought it deserved. To achieve this ambition the General tried to strengthen France’s geostrategic position through nuclear military power, and used this one as a lever to adequate the international order to Paris’ needs and designs. It was important not only to reassert French continental primacy, but also the role of Paris as a true pivotal country of the Western bloc’s and world’s affairs.
The final chapter of the thesis deals with the deepening of the political clash between France and the United States, with the formalization and the peak of the rapprochement between Paris and Bonn through the Élysée Treaty, and with de Gaulle’s decision of breaking the schemes of the Western defense system by making France leave NATO’s integrated structures. This decision marks the culmination of de Gaulle’s projects of making his country increasingly independent from its bloc and its bloc’s leader, using Paris’ status of nuclear power to (re)gain a more decisive role in Western European and world affairs. On the other hand, Germany, even if deprived of the chance of manufacturing atomic weapons, was able to gain the status of Western Europe’s rising power, to achieve perfect equality with France – thus succeeding in overcoming Paris’ fears and mistrust –, and to propose itself and be seen as a pillar of Western system of values and defense.