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ETD

Digital archive of theses discussed at the University of Pisa

 

Thesis etd-01192016-000456


Thesis type
Tesi di laurea magistrale
URN
etd-01192016-000456
Thesis title
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE LIGHT OF GAME THEORY APPROACH
Department
ECONOMIA E MANAGEMENT
Course of study
ECONOMICS
Supervisors
.
relatore Prof.ssa Giuliani, Elisa
Keywords
  • corporate social responsibility
  • Game theory
  • human rights
  • signaling game
Graduation session start date
22/02/2016
Availability
Withheld
Release date
22/02/2086
Abstract (Inglese)
Abstract (Italiano)
The thesis discusses a potential explanatory linkage between the classical game theory approach and the emerging phenomena of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in business and management. Within a decent scope of research, the thesis analyzes a model of signaling game with the integration of psychological elements by Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli (2014) and uses it as a framework for explaining the CSR strategies of firms, which are distinguished under different typologies by Elisa Giuliani (2014). I contend that the two papers, namely Persuasion with Reference Cues and Elaboration Costs (Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2014) and Human Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility in Developing Countries’ Industrial Clusters (Giuliani, 2014) demonstrate a synergy of thought, from their classical establishment to the extension of applications. This compatibility will be elaborated along the course of the thesis.
The thesis will demonstrate Bilancini and Boncinelli (2014)’s signaling game of two players with a signal-sending player of two types, namely high quality and low quality, who sends either high or low signal; and the signal-receiving player who perceives and processes the signals in either of the two elaboration levels, namely high elaboration or low elaboration (coarse thinking). Different strategic and psychological behaviors result in expected utilities that define equilibrium states. The game proves to be a model to explain Giuliani (2014)’s definition of low-road, window-dressing and rights oriented clusters as per CSR adoption and human rights practice. The concept of window-dressing cluster/firm will be analyzed under the game with regard to the reverse-signaling phenomenon where low quality player sending high signal, and vice versa for the silent CSR cluster/firm concept. Furthermore, a model of three types of signal-sending player will also be discussed under this CSR typology, which coincides with the authors’ suggested extension for further research.
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