• public employees
• retirement

This work, after presenting the main features of modern social security systems, focuses on some crucial issues concerning the Italian case. In particular the problem related to the existence of pension funds for public sector employees is addressed. Such an issue is originated by the virtuality of the management of the severance pay (TFR) since new potential debt might be created to meet the promises to future cohorts of pensioners. More precisely such a problem is tied to the fact that the cost for the State related to the TFR can become higher when public sector employees decide to join the complementary social security. The rates of return on pension funds applied to the TFR during the accumulation phase in fact are generally higher than the rate of revaluation of the TFR. Once identified these problems, we carry out some simulations in order to show the size of the extra cost that the State incurs to pay the TFR to civil servants enrolled in pension funds.